By Stephanie Segal and Dylan Gerstel
Forty years ago, Presidents Jimmy Carter and Deng Xiaoping signed the first U.S.-China Agreement on Cooperation in Science and Technology (S&T). The agreement promoted scientific exchange between the two countries and ushered in an era of robust bilateral research cooperation. Today, however, there is a growing concern in Washington that certain aspects of S&T collaboration pose a risk to economic and national security, making it the latest front in rising U.S.-China competition.
Although Washington had similar concerns with technology “leakage” to the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the risks posed by China today are different in scope and sophistication. Top U.S. intelligence officials have recently characterized Chinese graduate students and researchers at U.S. universities and laboratories as part of Beijing’s “societal approach to stealing innovation.” In response, lawmakers and administration officials have proposed stricter controls on foreign citizens’ access to U.S. scientific research, including by implementing stricter visa requirements and restricting participation in research at universities, national laboratories, and private companies.
At the same time, the U.S. innovation ecosystem depends greatly on foreign researchers and partnerships with foreign research institutions. As stated in National Security Decision Directive 189 (NSDD-189), “The strength of American science requires a research environment conducive to creativity, an environment in which the free exchange of ideas is a vital component.” In the words of Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) President L. Rafael Reif, “If all we do in response to China’s ambition is to try to double-lock all our doors, I believe we will lock ourselves into mediocrity.”
These considerations underscore the importance of a well-calibrated strategy toward foreign research collaboration that maximizes openness while protecting intellectual property (IP), research integrity, and national security. U.S. government agencies should work with universities and national laboratories to: enforce existing IP protections; disseminate and enforce conflict of interest and conflict of commitment disclosure requirements; and ensure adherence to peer review standards, including confidentiality. These efforts should preserve the ability of the United States to attract top talent, including by maintaining a welcoming environment for foreign researchers. Collaborating widely with international scientists is necessary to expose U.S. researchers to the best global talent and research, recognizing that the United States is not the undisputed global leader in all research fields. Mindful of the realities of global competition, any policy responses should consider the policies and approaches of third countries and coordinate actions with U.S. allies and partners.
Finally, the United States can only remain a global science and technology leader by investing at home. To boost human capital, efforts should focus on improving science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) outcomes, attracting and retaining more women and minorities in STEM fields, and expanding pathways for foreign students to remain in the United States after completing their degrees without reliance on funding sources of concern.
Stephanie Segal is senior fellow with the Simon Chair in political economy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. Dylan Gerstel is a research assistant with the Simon Chair at CSIS.