A geopolitical crisis is unfolding in Asia. It is not one which comes immediately to mind: the confrontation with Iran in the Gulf, India’s abolition of Kashmiristatehood, the continuing protests in Hong Kong, America’s trade war with China, or North Korea’s latest missiles launch. It is, instead, one which is unexpected and surprising between two states; democracies which should be natural, intrinsic allies against totalitarian neighbours: Japan and South Korea.
The confrontation, which is escalating, has had only sporadic coverage in the west. The consequences, however, are serious, with the strategic balance being shifted and bringing instability to the region. Neither side seemingly wants to be seen to be backing down, and the pace of diplomatic and economic sanctions against each other have risen in tempo along with combative rhetoric.
From trade issues to security pacts, what is unfolding at present is part of a bitter harvest of the past – but more on that later. The latest diplomatic salvo came from Seoul on Thursday, terminating an intelligence deal between the nations because of an earlier decision by Tokyo to downgrade South Korea’s preferential trade status.
Seoul said that downgrading had caused a “grave” change in the security cooperation between the countries. Tokyo will see its trade status reduced in kind as well, a change that would take effect in September. Japan’s prime minister, Shinzo Abe said the decision was damaging to mutual trust and called on Seoul to work to rebuild it.
Under the General Security of Military Information Agreement (Gsomia), which had been due for automatic renewal on Saturday, the two countries shared information on the threat posed by North Korea’s missile and nuclear programmes. South Korea’s deputy national security adviser Kim Hyun-chong told reporters on Friday that “there is no longer any justification” for South Korea to continue the deal, which began in 2016, because of Japan’s claim that basic trust between the countries had been undermined.
Allies and adversaries are being drawn into the standoff in interesting and significant ways. Abe said Japan would “continue to closely coordinate with the US to ensure regional peace and prosperity” in the wake of decision by South Korea. The Seoul official, Kim, also said that the impasse was “an opportunity to upgrade the South Korea-US alliance, in close cooperation”.
The Trump administration has failed to do much to heal the breach between its two most important allies, both with American troops present on the ground. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo attempted to intercede briefly, but the president, say American officials, either fails to understand what is going on and its consequences, or is uninterested in it. His pronouncement on the situation, so far, has been to instruct the two sides to “sit down and get on with each other”.
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There is much less American interest in getting involved in this east Asian problem than there was in the ongoing confrontation between two other American allies, a Saudi Arabian-led bloc and Qatar. But there we have the money factor – US arms sales to the Saudis, Emiratis and Qatar is helping the business ventures of Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law. This is not something present in the dispute between the Pacific states.
China is now attempting to move into this gap, offering to act as a mediator. At a summit between the foreign ministers of the three countries on Wednesday in Beijing the Chinese foreign minister, Wang Yi, offered to help facilitate dialogue. But it was not the smoothest of beginnings to the talks, with the South Korean foreign minister Kang Kyung-wha lambasting Tokyo over the trade restrictions, while her Japanese counterpart, Taro Kono, remonstrated that bilateral issues should not be brought up in trilateral meetings.
But the dispute presents China with an opportunity to portray itself as the area’s benevolent “big brother’’, helping to sort out issues between smaller siblings. It would also, potentially, draw closer two countries which have maritime territorial disputes with Beijing.
As it stands, the souring relations between Tokyo and Seoul puts a trade partnership worth $80bn (£65m) at risk; the strategic military intelligence-sharing agreement between the two states has been extremely useful to the US and the west in obtaining information about North Korea and China.
On trade, Japan has tightened control over the export of three chemicals which are needed for producing semi-conductors, which are a lucrative export good for South Korea. Tokyo claims this was due to suspicion that sensitive information was getting passed to North Korea – something Seoul vehemently denies. The decision by Tokyo to remove South Korea from the list of “trusted” favoured trading partners has paved the way for even more delays in exports such as auto parts and household electronics. Seoul has demanded that Japan explains its plans to discharge waste water contaminated by the meltdown of the Fukushima nuclear plant into the sea; something, it is claimed, which will have a damaging environmental impact on South Korea.
There is also a public campaign in South Korea with some people boycotting Japanese goods ranging from from cat food to cars. Other outbreaks of patriotism have included beauty queens refusing to travel to Japan for contests; Japanese horses being barred from an equestrian event and popular Japanese anime cartoons being replaced by indigenous ones in some shops.
You can trace the latest diplomatic spat back to decades of acrimony over the shared history of the two nations. Last October South Korea’s Supreme Court ruled that Japanese companies should pay reparations to Koreans used as forced labour during the occupation of the peninsula by the Japanese Empire between 1910 and 1945. The victims, ruled the judges, could seek damages from two Japanese multinationals, Nippon Steel and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. Japan rejected the ruling, holding that the issue had been fully settled in 1965 when it paid South Korea $300m in grants, $200m in aid and $200m in loans, worth around $4bn in today’s value.
Tokyo charges that there is a pattern of reneging on deals by Seoul, pointing to another one in 2015 in which compensation was paid, and a full apology made for the use of “comfort women” who were used in Japanese military brothels during the Second World War. The South Korean president, Moon Jae-in, later rejected the agreement because, he said, the women who had suffered had not been properly consulted.
“These decisions are extremely regrettable and totally unacceptable,” declared Mr Kono, the Japanese foreign minister. “The decisions completely overthrow the legal foundation of the friendly and cooperative relationship that Japan and the Republic of Korea have developed since the normalisation of diplomatic relations in 1965.”
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Such historical disputes have also helped shape this state of affairs. The 1965 deal was signed on behalf of South Korea by then president, Park Chung-hee, a conservative politician who had once served as an officer in the Japanese Imperial Army. There are many on the left in South Korea who consider people such as Park to have been collaborators. But they were, for a long time, the state’s power base. Park’s daughter, Park Geun-hye, became president before being removed from office and sent to prison following corruption allegations.
The current president, Moon Jae-in, is of the left and holds that the 1965 agreement was flawed and unfair. President Park was regarded as a friend by Nobusuke Kishi, a Japanese conservative politician who was indicted as a war crimes suspect for his actions in Manchuria (which the Japanese turned into the Empire of Manchukuo with a puppet ruler in the 1930s) and jailed.
Mr Kishi, however, was never convicted and released after pressure from influential Americans who saw him as a potent candidate to form a right-wing alliance against the socialists. Mr Kishi became prime minister when the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) came to power and attempted to change the country’s pacifist postwar constitution, imposed by the Americans, which abjured the use of military force. He did not succeed.
Mr Abe, who is Mr Kishi’s grandson, is trying to carry out similar changes to the constitution and may have a better chance of making this happen. There are some in South Korea who say they are worried that the Japanese rearming may put their country in danger
As we have warned, if Japan intentionally strikes at our economy, Japan itself will also have to bear significant damage…We will never again lose to Japan
The legacy of Japanese rule remains in South Korea. Earlier this month, on National Liberation Day, marking the end of colonial rule, thousands joined a protest march in Seoul waving placards saying “No Abe! No Japan!” Some wore T-shirts with the wording “I couldn’t fight for Korea’s independence, but I will join the boycott!” During an emergency cabinet meeting on the trade dispute, President Moon declared: “As we have warned, if Japan intentionally strikes at our economy, Japan itself will also have to bear significant damage … We will never again lose to Japan.”
There are complaints in South Korea, as well as some other countries in the region, that unlike Germany, Japan has never fully apologised for the crimes committed in the war. There have been regular protests from China and North Korea about members of the Japanese cabinet visiting Yasukuni Shrine, where convicted war criminals are buried among others who lost their lives serving the emperor.
But, despite all the acrimony, geopolitics dictates that South Korea and Japan patch up their differences facing an expansionist China and sabre-rattling North Korea
The man who may inadvertently help to facilitate this is Donald Trump. The US president’s threats to pull troops out of the two countries, his view that security and stability is a matter of monetary transaction with allies paying the US, as well as the failure to curb Kim Jong-un’s militarisation in North Korea means that Tokyo and Seoul will be forced by necessity to think less about the rancour of the past and focus more about risks of the present and future.