FOR MORE than six months, austere-looking mullahs have been meeting in the Gulf for talks with sharp-suited diplomats. The contrasting envoys represent enemies that have been at war for nearly two decades. The Taliban and America are more used to conversing through suicide-bombings and air strikes, but in Doha and Abu Dhabi, they have formally sat down to talk, and will do so again on February 25th. Years of barren diplomacy have been replaced by a rush of activity. Moscow has hosted spin-off talks between the Taliban and other parties. Hopes have been raised after years of despair. What might the US-Taliban talks achieve?Talks had been rejected by both sides for years. When Osama Bin Laden’s 9/11 attacks rocked America, the superpower turned on the Taliban regime harbouring him in Afghanistan. With the religious obscurantists blasted out of power in weeks, Washington had little desire to parley. America rejected an early Taliban offer of a negotiated surrender, drove them out of Afghanistan and lent its support to a new government. Together with its allies, America poured billions of dollars into propping up the country, funding everything from schools to a new army. Yet as nation-building foundered in corruption and neglect, the Taliban crept back. The US-led NATO coalition found itself fighting a regenerated and now uncompromising force. Both sides thought they could win by strength alone as the bodies and costs piled up. What has changed now? America acknowledges that it is not winning and that the conflict is at best a stalemate. President Donald Trump has criticised the campaign and appears to believe America should cut its losses. Pakistan, accused of harbouring the Taliban and sabotaging previous peace efforts, also appears to have changed tack, Western officials say. Fearful of chaos from an American withdrawal, it now wants the Taliban to talk.
Zalmay Khalilzad, Mr Trump’s special envoy to the region, announced late last month that a framework for a peace deal had been agreed in principle. The bones of the pact would see America withdraw, and the militants guarantee that terrorists like al-Qaeda would never again be able to use Afghan soil to launch attacks. The framework would also see a ceasefire and talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government. Mr Khalilzad says the Taliban cannot have a withdrawal without the other bits, or as he put it, “Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.” Questions still abound. How long a withdrawal will take and how complete it will be is unclear. How the withdrawal will be sequenced with Afghan talks and a ceasefire is also unknown. Diplomats face a long, bumpy road.
Beyond uncertainty about the framework there are wider doubts. Firstly, with Mr Trump itching to dump a campaign he considers a costly failure, it is fair to wonder whether the talks are a genuine attempt to solve Afghanistan’s agony, or merely cover for a rush to the exits. Secondly, the framework focuses on American and Taliban gripes, while ignoring the vast majority of Afghan people. Thirdly, it is unclear how the Taliban will coexist with an Afghan government to which they refuse to speak, and with factions they fought long before the Americans arrived. And fourthly, it is not known how keenly the Taliban want to return to the harsh Islamic strictures of their regime. Is their participation in talks even genuine, or a ploy to wait out an impatient Washington? Afghanistan’s anguish can only be eased through negotiations and for all the worrying questions, the current push is the best chance so far. Yet they are unlikely to progress quickly and America will need patience. A precipitous pull-out risks undermining Afghanistan’s fragile state as it negotiates with the Taliban. Afghanistan was at war long before American troops arrived and a phoney settlement to cover Mr Trump’s exit will see the country at war long after they leave.