In March 2011, antigovernment protests broke out in Syria, which has been ruled by the Asad family for more than four decades. The protests spread, violence escalated (primarily but not exclusively by Syrian government forces), and numerous political and armed opposition groups emerged. In August 2011, President Barack Obama called on Syrian President Bashar al Asad to step down. Over time, the rising death toll from the conflict, and the use of chemical weapons by the Asad government, intensified pressure for the United States and others to assist the opposition. In 2013, Congress debated lethal and nonlethal assistance to vetted Syrian opposition groups, and authorized the latter. Congress also debated, but did not authorize, the use of force in response to an August 2013 chemical weapons attack.
In 2014, the Obama Administration requested authority and funding from Congress to provide lethal support to vetted Syrians for select purposes. The original request sought authority to support vetted Syrians in “defending the Syrian people from attacks by the Syrian regime,” but the subsequent advance of the Islamic State organization from Syria across Iraq refocused executive and legislative deliberations onto counterterrorism. Congress authorized a Department of Defense-led train and equip program to combat terrorist groups active in Syria, defend the United States and its partners from Syria-based terrorist threats, and “promote the conditions for a negotiated settlement to end the conflict in Syria.”
In September 2014, the United States began air strikes in Syria, with the stated goal of preventing the Islamic State from using Syria as a base for its operations in neighboring Iraq. In October 2014, the Defense Department established Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) to “formalize ongoing military actions against the rising threat posed by ISIS in Iraq and Syria.” CJTF-OIR came to encompass more than 70 countries, and has bolstered the efforts of local Syrian partner forces against the Islamic State. The United States also gradually increased the number of U.S. personnel in Syria from 50 in late 2015 to roughly 2,000 by late 2017. President Trump in early 2018 called for an expedited withdrawal of U.S. forces from Syria,1 but senior Administration officials later stated that U.S. personnel would remain in Syria to ensure the enduring defeat of the Islamic State. National Security Advisor John Bolton also stated that U.S. forces would remain in Syria until the withdrawal of Iranian-led forces.2 Then, in December 2018, President Trump announced that U.S. troops in Syria would be returning “now.” 3
U.S. and coalition-backed forces in Syria succeeded in retaking, from 2015 through December 2018, nearly all of the territory once held by the Islamic State. Meanwhile, other outside actors (Lebanese Hezbollah, Iran, and Russia) continued to support the Syrian government’s military campaigns against opposition groups. Conflict between the coalition’s Syrian Kurdish partners and Turkey has further complicated the situation, as has the entrenchment of Al Qaeda-affiliated groups among the opposition and the ongoing humanitarian crisis. As of late 2018, 5.6 million Syrians are registered as refugees in nearby countries, with 5.7 million more internally displaced.
The collapse of IS and opposition territorial control in most of Syria since 2015 has been matched by significant military and territorial gains by the Syrian government. The U.S. intelligence community’s 2018 Worldwide Threat Assessment stated in February 2018 that, “The conflict has decisively decisively shifted in the Syrian regime’s favor, enabling Russia and Iran to further entrench themselves inside the country.” 4
The U.N. has sponsored peace talks in Geneva, but it is unclear when (or whether) the parties might reach a political settlement that could result in a transition away from Asad. With many armed opposition groups weakened, defeated, or geographically isolated, military pressure on the Syrian government to make concessions to the opposition has been reduced. U.S. officials have stated that the United States will not fund reconstruction in Asad-held areas unless a political solution is reached in accordance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 2254.5
Issues for Congress
Congress has considered the following key issues since the outbreak of the Syria conflict in 2011:
What are the core U.S. national interests in Syria? What objectives derive from those interests? How should U.S. goals in Syria be prioritized?
What financial, military, and personnel resources are required to implement U.S. objectives in Syria? What measures or metrics can be used to gauge progress?
Should the U.S. military continue to operate in Syria? For what purposes and on what authority? For how long?
How are developments in Syria affecting other countries in the region, including U.S. partners?
What potential consequences of U.S. action or inaction should be considered? How might other outside actors respond to U.S. choices?
Amid significant territorial losses by the Islamic State and Syrian opposition groups since 2015 and parallel military gains by the Syrian government and coalition partner forces, U.S. policymakers face a number of questions and potential decision points related to the following factors:
U.S. military operations and the presence of U.S. military personnel in Syria
The announcement by President Trump in December 2018 that U.S. forces would withdraw from Syria was welcomed by the Syrian government and its Russian and Iranian partners, along with observers who question the necessity, utility, and legality of continued U.S. operations. The decision has also drawn domestic and international criticism from those who argue it may enable the re-emergence of the Islamic State and embolden Russia and Iran in Syria (see “President Trump Announces Withdrawal”). Some Members of Congress have called upon President Trump to reconsider his decision to withdraw U.S. forces, stating that the move is premature and “threatens the safety and security of the United States.” 6 Others have embraced the decision, citing concerns about the lack of specific authorization for the U.S. campaign and the effectiveness of U.S. efforts.7 Members of the 116th Congress may seek clarification on Administration’s strategy to ensure the enduring defeat of the Islamic State. Defense Department officials in August stated that the group remained “well-positioned to rebuild and work on enabling its physical caliphate to re-emerge,” 8 and, prior to resigning, the Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS stated in December 2018 that a U.S. withdrawal would be “reckless.”
The future of the Syria Train and Equip program
The Islamic State has lost the territory it once held in Syria, and much of that territory is now controlled by local forces that have received U.S. training and assistance since 2014. (See Figure 3 and Figure 4.) In 2017 and 2018, significant reductions in IS territorial control prompted some reevaluation of the Syria Train and Equip (T&E) program, whose primary purpose had been to support offensive campaigns against Islamic State forces. The Trump Administration requested $300 million in FY2019 Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF) monies for Syria programs, largely intended to shift toward training local partners as a hold force. The Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 115-245) provided $1.35 billion for the CTEF account, slightly less than the Administration’s requested amount for the overall account ($1.4 billion) based on congressional concerns about some Syria-related funds.
The FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) extended the Syria T&E program’s authority through the end of 2018, but the FY2018 NDAA did not extend it further, asking instead for the Trump Administration to submit a report on its proposed strategy for Syria by February 2018. The FY2019 NDAA (P.L. 115-232) prohibits the obligation of FY2019 defense funds for the program until the strategy required by the FY2018 NDAA and an additional update report on train and equip efforts are submitted to Congress. The FY2019 act extended the Syria T&E authority through December 2019 but did not adjust the program’s authorized scope or purposes.
The U.S. withdrawal from Syria may challenge the ability of the United States to implement its previously stated goal of training local partners to manage any local Islamic State resurgence. The primary U.S. local partner in Syria, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), includes a significant contingent of Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG). Turkey considers the YPG to be a terrorist group, and has stated its intent to launch an expanded military campaign in northern Syria targeting YPG forces. Likely judging that the withdrawal of U.S. troops would remove the final impediment to a Turkish strike, the YPG has requested support from the Syrian military— potentially paving the way for a reconciliation between Syrian Kurds and the Asad-led Syrian government.10
President Trump has stated that U.S. forces could use Iraq as a base from which to engage any IS remnants in Syria.11 However, cooperation or partnership between the Syrian military and Kurdish forces would limit the ability of the United States to work with its former Kurdish allies against the Islamic State. For their part, Kurdish forces may also be reluctant to cooperate with the United States. Responding to news of the U.S. withdrawal, the Kurdish commander of the SDF stated in an interview, “All the credibility and trust that was built, we have lost.” 12 While the United States has also partnered with Syrian Arab militias in the counter-IS campaign, these are generally seen as less capable than Kurdish forces.