Numerous war games have been held over the Baltic States and a potential war between NATO and Russia in the Baltic Region. While all these war games are focused on the events on land there is an important aspect that remains largely untouched and that is the role of missile systems, both offensive and defensive, in a potential conflict in the Baltic States. Most analysts are well aware of the capacities that Russian missile systems such as the Iskander-M ballistic missile and S-400 air defence missiles have but few stand still on the capabilities that these missile systems give to Russia in order to obtain the upper hand in a possible conflict. The operational and strategic impact of these missile systems can not only facilitate a Russian military operation in the Baltic Region but serve as well on the isolation of the Baltic States from outside support. These missile systems are the cornerstone of an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy that is aimed to keep reinforcements out of the conflict zone.
S-300/S-400 systems
The arrival of the S-300 air defence systems in Syria has shown that Russia has the missile systems needed to create an effective air exclusion zone. The deployment of the S-300 not only made the western coalition reconsider its approach in the air campaign against ISIS but also to realize that the S-300 possess a major threat to allied aircraft. The S-300 is very difficult to attack, in part due to its mobility making tracking it a difficult task. Several US officials already made media statements doubting the capability of the US Air Force to deal effectively with the S-300 air defence system.
Closer at home Russia operates the even more advanced S-400 air defence system and is working on a new version, the S-500 system. These systems are even more challenging for NATO aircraft to engage and destroy. The range of the S-400 is estimated to be 250 kilometres and 400 kilometres, depending on the type of missile that is used. In general it is expected that the S-400 has a full operational range of 250 kilometres.
The strategic deployment of the S-400 air defence system placed in Narva, Pskov and Kaliningrad will allow Russia to cover most of the Baltic States and create a no-fly zone. This coverage can be extended if Russia places S-400 missile systems near the border of Belarus and Lithuania. Russia can even cover the whole Baltic States if the S-400 air defence system has indeed an effective range of 400 kilometres.
Russia is thus able to interdict NATO air operations in the Baltic States at the onset of a potential conflict while at the same time it can keep its advancing troops protected from NATO air attacks.
Iskander-M
The Iskander-M ballistic missile (NATO code name SS-26 Stone) is a short ranged ballistic missile that can deliver accurate strikes against high priority, small-sized and dispersed area targets. The Iskander can hit targets as far as 500 kilometers away making it ideal for targeting critical infrastructure such as command centers, bridges, depots, barracks, etc. deep in the enemy rear.
The Iskander-M ballistic missiles further strengthens Russia’s A2/AD strategy in the Baltic Region. Russian can isolate and cripple troop movements inside the Baltic States by talking out key infrastructure as well as command and control centres. Placing the Iskander-M missile system in Kaliningrad will even further isolate the Baltic States as Russia will then be able to conduct strikes in Poland and Germany, isolating the Baltic States from any immediate outside support.
Restricting NATO
The deployment of missile systems will raise the stakes for NATO in order to create a credible conventional deterrent against Russia. Russia’s A2/AD strategy will severely restrict NATO movements and deployments without the risk of being targeted. NATO planners must thus be aware of the A2/AD strategy and find ways to overcome it. There are two ways to overcome this strategy, either by intercepting Russia’s missiles or by jamming their acquisition systems.
Jamming the acquisition systems means that NATO will have to place a certain focus on electronic warfare such as jamming the radar systems of the Russian missile systems in order to avoid detection. At the same time NATO will need to look to place missile systems of their own in the Baltic States that is able to intercept the Russian missiles. If not then NATO will face the prospect of having to operate in an environment where it has a very limited freedom of movement while Russia enjoys the maximum of freedom of movement that it can achieve.
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