The strategic goal of BALTOPS

On June 3 NATO started its annual Baltic operations training exercise, commonly known as BALTOPS. The exercise comes in the middle of high tensions between NATO and Russia, as was the case last year. These tensions have made the Baltic States very insecure about Russia’s actions in the latest years and thus a strong military presence in the Baltic Region is needed to deter Russia from taking an aggressive course of action.

BALTOPS brings this deterrence and prepares NATO for possible future operations in the Baltic Region. Baltic Defense Blog will go in deeper in the purpose and strategic goals of the BALTOPS exercise.

BALTOPS in the past

The BALTOPS exercise was first created in 1971 by the US Navy. Its goal was limited to the deployment of naval forces in the Baltic Sea and the focus was on training sea manoeuvres such as gunnery exercises, replenishment at sea anti-submarine operations, mine countermeasures and maritime interdiction operations. BALTOPS made it clear that the US navy, and later on NATO naval forces, were training to confront the Soviet Baltic Fleet in their own home waters.

BALTOPS thus followed the principle that training grounds should resemble the expected future battlefields. NATO warships training for naval warfare in the Baltic Sea prepared them for the day when the Cold War turned hot and NATO warships were expected to confront the Soviet Navy, gain sea control of the waters surrounding the Soviet Union and strike the flanks of a Soviet Offensive that would be happening in Western Europe. Since the fall of the Soviet Union the need for such offensive training disappeared but the exercise remained an annual event as NATO used the exercise to cooperate with neutral countries.

Strategic change

Today’s BALTOPS is no longer focused solely on the maritime domain. The expansion of NATO towards the Russian border has changed the strategic challenge in the Baltic States. The days that the Baltic Sea was largely a Soviet lake are gone and the Baltic Sea is currently an open sea. The Russian Baltic Fleet is still the largest fleet in the Baltic Sea but has only two naval bases left, the Kaliningrad region and its naval bases near Saint Petersburg. The second largest navy in terms of combat power is the Swedish Navy but Sweden is considered a neutral in the eyes of NATO.

The days are also gone that the entire southern and eastern shores of the Baltic Sea were hostile Soviet territory with military targets for striking the Soviet flank. Today, these countries have become NATO members and are thus allies and no longer foes. BALTOPS has thus shifted in its strategic relevance.

BALTOPS today

BALTOPS still has its relevance in the maritime domain. The Russian Baltic Fleet is still active in the Baltic Sea and is thus a cause of concern for NATO planners. Should Russia attempt to intervene in the Baltic States then it will do so with little warning and Russia is expected to take the initiative. This means that the Baltic Fleet will get out first to establish sea control in the Baltic Sea, cutting of the maritime links of the Baltic States. NATO forces must thus still be trained to regain sea control and defeat the Russian Baltic Fleet.

But BALTOPS must go even further. Any possible conflict in Eastern Europe will also involve Russia establishing air superiority in the opening phase. Aside from anti-surface and anti-subsurface warfare the maritime forces of NATO must also be trained in anti-air warfare. NATO maritime forces must thus be trained in all aspects of naval warfare during BALTOPS.

An important aspect of BALTOPS is not only training to gain sea control but also on how to use this sea control. For many years BALTOPS was also the framework for allied nations to train mine countermeasure operations to keep merchant routes and ports open as well as dispose of left over sea mines from both World Wars and the Cold War. This could also be an important aspect in a possible future conflict were Russia could lay minefields to hamper maritime movement.

The most important aspect of exploiting sea control is however missing from BALTOPS, namely projecting power ashore. Once a fleet is in control of the Baltic Sea it can use this control to execute raids on coastal targets or even execute a small scale amphibious assault against enemy forces in control of the coast.

Also maritime reinforcement should be practised. Since Tallinn and Riga are large ports they can serve as point of debarkation for reinforcements to aid in the defence of the Baltic States against a Russian invasion. Protecting supply ships and convoys are thus also an important aspect for BALTOPS.

Aside from the maritime role there is also the need to expand the BALTOPS into the ground and aerial domains in order to train for a full scale engagement against a potential adversary in the Baltic Region. BALTOPS coincides with several other military exercises that are being held in the Baltic Region. Aside from BALTOPS, NATO is holding the following exercises:

• Operation Anaconda 16 in Poland.
• Operation Dragon Ride II, moving US mechanized forces overland from Germany towards Estonia.
• Exercise Sabre Strike in the Baltic States, training at company and battalion level.
• Exercise Iron Wolf, Lithuanian exercise to train multinational forces.

While all these exercises are either held by NATO or with participation and overview from NATO, they still are independent exercises. Since BALTOPS is already focussing on securing sea control in the Baltic Sea we advocate that the scope of this exercise is enlarged and to have all military exercises on land, sea and air, integrated in a single large framework. In short, such a large exercise would simulate nothing less than training for full scale war and would be highly controversial given the current geopolitical situation.


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