To beat the enemy, one must know the enemy. Up until now we still don’t have a clear grip on what is going on in the heads of the Russian elites, most notably Russian President Vladimir Putin. Over the past years the world has seen how Russia has been more and more willing to use military force in pursuit of political, economic and territorial gains. Georgia, Crimea and Eastern Ukraine are clear examples of how Russia is using its military might and this makes the Baltic States fear about their independence. But what exactly is the Russian strategic game? What does Russia hope to accomplish on the long term and how can these goal be achieved? Will President Putin continue to threaten the Baltic States or can outside events force Russia to back down?
In order to understand the Russian actions we need to know how Russia views the current geopolitical and strategic situation and what drives and motivates the Russian leaders in their decision making processes.
NATO – the main enemy
NATO is and will remain the main enemy for Russia. The recent defence doctrines in use by the Russian Armed Forces state clearly that NATO will be the biggest threat towards Russian security. NATO’s expansion into Eastern Europe in the years after the fall of the Soviet Union is the biggest threat to Russia’s geopolitical situation in the eyes of many elites. Russia feels that it is slowly getting surrounded by a military alliance hostile to Russia but NATO is not just a military threat, it is also a political and economic threat to Russia.
After the fall of the Soviet Union almost every nation in Eastern Europe looked towards the EU, US and NATO. These countries were eager to break with Russia and were all looking to the West as their new partners and allies. Only Belarus remained an ally of Russia while Ukraine was largely neutral with pro-Russian and pro-western presidents mostly taking turns.
With Eastern Europe integrating into the EU there was a real loss of power and influence that Russia once had over these countries. The loss of political influence translated itself in Russia no longer being able to force economic deals with Eastern Europe, thus leading to a loss in economic power for Russia. The only leverage Russia had left in this region was the fact that it was the only supplier of oil and natural gas. Without it, Russia would be largely isolated from Europe on the economic level. Russia’s sphere of influence shrunk considerably as a result from this transition and transformed Russia from a global superpower into a regional power.
Losing the political, and the resulting economic, influence over Eastern Europe was not the only bad news for Russia. The Warsaw Pact not only served as a military alliance against NATO but its countries were also a buffer protecting Russia from any invader coming from Europe.
Russia needs a buffer between itself and the rest of Europe, which is the general consensus among Russian leaders. Russia suffered from three great invasions on its territory, namely the invasion by Napoleon and the two World Wars. Each time and invader had a direct land border with Russia. Russia thus needs a buffer in order to prevent a new invasion from doing maximum damage on Russian soil.
The bigger the buffer, the more damage Russia can do on an invader before they reach Russian soil. The Warsaw Pact offered Russia the biggest buffer it could ever create but after the fall of the Soviet Union this buffer disappeared. At the moment only Belarus serves as a buffer but this country only protects the centre part of Russia’s border with Europe.
The need for a new buffer
As stated earlier, only Belarus is currently a buffer for Russia but the Baltic States have become NATO members and this possess a strategic threat towards Russia, more specifically Saint Petersburg. Saint Petersburg still remains the most important city within the Russian Federation due to its historic, cultural, political and economic significance. Having NATO troops stationed 200km away from this city is in Russian eyes unacceptable.
Belarus covers the centre of the European border and the Baltic States are now firmly within NATO. Russian leaders were not happy with this event but were able to tolerate or endure this situation. The major change in their reasoning came however in 2008 when Georgia, in a bid to join NATO, launched an invasion in South-Ossetia against Russian separatists in order to stabilize its internal situation. The protection of Ethnic Russians is an important factor in the eyes of the Russian elite who are looking more to the majestic Czarist Russia rather than the days of the Soviet Union. Russia thus made its first war against Georgia in order to maintain the status quo and protect its sphere of influence it has over the Caucasus Region.
Ukraine was also a buffer state in the eyes of Russia but only if the country remained neutral or pro-Russia. A pro-western or nationalistic Ukraine would become a possible threat and Russian fears became a reality by the end of 2013 when nationalistic uprisings on Maidan Square wanted to overthrow the pro-Russian Ukrainian government. Russia knew that it was losing its influence over Ukraine and the country would only become more and more orientated to the West and even a possible NATO partner. Should Ukraine become a NATO member then Russia would be open on its northern and southern flanks. Russian intervention in the Crimea served to maintain the port of Sevastopol in Russian hands so that Russian influence over the Black Sea would be maintained. Its intervention in Eastern Ukraine is aimed purely to create a break-away region that could serve as a small buffer between Russia and a pro-western Ukraine
Setting the chessboard
Russians are chess players and the best of them are the people who run the Kremlin. Every move the Russian government, and ultimate President Putin, makes is carefully planned in advance with every possible countermove taken in effect. Russia seldom undertakes measures that are impulsive. This does not mean that Russia is adverse of risks, far from it. However, Russia only takes risks after the necessary thought and going through the cost-benefit ratio of every move it makes. The higher the stakes and the more benefits the more risks and costs Russia is willing to undertake to achieve its goals.
The situation on the European border is clear to Russia. For them NATO is a hostile organisation that has cost them political and economic power in Eastern Europe. Russia feels itself a large regional player and even a global player and will not tolerate to be isolated and degraded to a mere regional player with little influence on global affairs. This view is not important on the foreign policy of Russia but also domestic affairs. President Putin has high approval ratings because he rebuilt Russia out of the economic downfall of the 1990s. The Russian people are led to believe NATO is hostile and in the way of Russia seeking to claim its past greatness and global influence. Should Putin fail to deliver these promises then his regime will face a lot of domestic pressure and even the call for him to step down.
NATO now stands at 200 kilometres of Saint Petersburg and in the south Russia is losing its influence over Ukraine and the Caucasus. A further reduction of Russia’s sphere of influence is no longer tolerable for the Russian elite. They feel they need to confront and resist NATO from now on to stop it from expanding at the expense of Russia and her interests. Russia can not win a war against NATO, not conventionally and not without great cost. At the same time the prospect of another large military power attacking Russia first and creating untold damage on Russian soil is once again on the horizon. This is the reality the Russian elites are seeing, another possible conqueror of their homeland and unlike several decades ago there is no buffer to keep him at bay, no neutral countries that can absorb the attack and bleed the invader before he crosses the Russian border. For this Russian elite the question is not if NATO is willing to attack them but when this attack will come. And even without an attack it can not allow to let NATO expand and shrink Russia’s sphere of influence. In order to feel safe the Russian elites are looking to create a new buffer on their border. Belarus is a faithful ally; the situation in Eastern Ukraine is being used as a new small buffer with Russia supporting the separatist in their bid for independency. It is unlikely that Russia seeks to annex the Luhansk and Donetsk regions as a prolonged conflict in Ukraine will have Ukraine focused intern and less on Russia. This only leaves the situation in the Baltic Region to be solved but this will require Russia to be very careful since the Baltic States are part of NATO and the EU and any conflict between them and Russia can spark the larger war with NATO that Russia seeks to avoid.
Multiple pressure points
Russia views itself as a European nation that extends deep into Asia but will remain focused on Europe. Through all its history Russia has always been, and will always be, a European nation and its strategic position in Europe will be the most dominant factor. This does not mean that Russia is only concerned on Europe. There are other regions along Russia’s border that could become a threat to Russia’s sphere of influence and cause further isolation. These factors must also be taken in account.
Aside from its European border the Russians are also very keen in keeping their influence over the Caucasus. Georgia joining NATO is another scenario that will cross their red line since it will directly influence their power in the Caucasus. Recent tensions with Turkey will also undermine Russia’s influence in this region since Turkey supports both Georgia and Azerbaijan. Only Armenia is a Russian ally but this country is isolated from Russia’s southern border and con not act as a protective buffer.
Russia must also work hard to keep its influence in the Middle East. The Middle East is the most important region for Russia to sell arms and these military sales gives Russia an economic boost as well as political power in the Middle East. Current events are pushing Russia in the arms of Shi’ite Muslims as two of Russia’s biggest partners are Iran and Syria. The Russian intervention in Syria served only to keep President al-Assad in power and to protect Russia’s naval base in Tartus and Latakia. Should Syria collapse then Russia loses its use of these two ports, greatly diminishing Russia’s naval influence in the eastern Mediterranean.
Russia’s cooperation with China has several political and economic benefits for both nations but this relation will be put under pressure in the next decades. China needed Russian technology, especially military technology, to close the gap with other Asian countries. China is now slowly reaching to point where it can develop new technologies on its own, decreasing the need to depend on the Russians. The only thing Russia will be able to deliver in the future is the delivery of oil and natural gas from Siberia to China. At the same time China will be expanding its influence across Asia and both nations will find themselves competing in Central Asia, an area Russia views as its backyard. Sino-Russian relations will be put under pressure in this region.
On the military level there is little that China can offer. Russia is focused on NATO while China is focused on expanding its sphere of influence in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Both have only one thing in common and that is the fact that they pose strategic challenges towards the United States. But any war against NATO will not involve the Pacific just as any war in the Pacific will not involve NATO. It is possible that China and Russia are looking to see who will move first to draw the attention of the United States away. This is why the United States are calling on the EU to develop its own military means to deal with Russia so that the United States can become more focused on China and less on Russia.
Conclusion for the Baltic Region
Russian strategic goals and geopolitics is complex and various military, economic and political factors come into play. There are still some several fixed points, namely the threat of NATO enlargement into Eastern Europe and the loss of Russian influence in the near-abroad and on the global stage. From an historic point there is a need to have a buffer between Russia and its enemies, the main enemy being NATO. Within this buffer Russia can exercise its political and economic influence to its own benefits.
NATO enlargements in the Baltic States is touching a red line in the eyes of the Russian elite who see their country directly threatened but were able to tolerate or endure this situation. The loss of its influence over Ukraine and the prospect of losing influence over the Caucasus are red lines for Russia as well and crossing them have forced Russia to react and seek to restore the balance or create a new balance that is acceptable for Russia. Russia does not believe that it is acting but honestly feels that it must react to outside events or face losing more power and influence and lose its global player status.
Russia can only be focused so long on its European borders before it feels the pressure on other fronts building up. Time is not on the side of Russia and if Russia wants to create a buffer between itself and NATO it needs to act sooner rather than later. Economic conditions prevent Russia from building up its Armed Forces fast enough to close the gap with NATO. At the same time every action, or reaction, Russia takes only emboldens NATO to be more serious about its stance against Russia and creates more unity in the Alliance. The new plans of NATO strengthening its military positions in Eastern Europe and placing more troops in the Baltic States are pushing another red line in the eyes of the Russian elites, namely the threat it poses to Saint Petersburg and the western region. Off course Russia reacts by strengthening its position with new divisions to be placed in Kaliningrad as well as the creation of the 1st Guards Tank Army, a military formation aimed to take on NATO forces.
The options are limited in the Baltic States since Russia wants to evade a war with NATO. Still, Russia feels that it has to do something and is calculating all its options. Knowing that time is against them they might be willing to take bold actions in the Baltic States as long as these actions are giving them the best results.
We can not say what Russia might do. It might be possible that building up its military strength in the region will only be defensive to deter NATO from taking any actions against Russian interests. It might also be possible that Russia will seek to undermine the Baltic States and create internal problems, either covert or overt. However, Russia is now fixed on the events in the Baltic States and the stakes are rising for them. With the situation in Ukraine being acceptable, a prolonged conflict that prevents Ukraine from joining NATO, Russia has the time and resources to find a solution for the threat of NATO in the Baltic Region before other events are forcing it to focus on other regions where Russian influence is being threatened.
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