- With the announcement of a third brigade ready for Operation Atlantic Resolve the United States keep expanding their operation.
- The operation is still focused on reassurance instead of building a credible deterrence.
- Training with allies has so far been from a opposite point of view of what will be needed.
- With the United States even more committed, the EU remains silent on joining the operation.
Introduction
On Wednesday 30 March the United States announced the deployment of an additional armoured brigade towards Eastern Europe in order to strengthen the Operation Atlantic Resolve. This moves shows a further strengthening of the commitment of the United States to contribute to the collective security by NATO in the face of Russia’s growing assertiveness and eagerness to use military force in pursuit of political goals.
Operation Atlantic Resolve was create in April 2014, after the annexation of Crimea. The whole operation is intended to rotate US troops around Eastern Europe and let them take part in joint military exercises, notably in the Baltic States and Poland. As tensions with Russia continued to rise the United States have been sending more and more troops towards the continent. The latest announcement of sending another armoured brigade towards Europe will increase the US presence to a level of three brigades at all times. Though this might seem a large force it still falls short of the troop levels in 2012 when the United States deployed four brigades in Europe. In all, the average number of US troops in Europe is estimated to be around 60,000 personnel while in 2012 this number was around 70,000 personnel. This forces us to take a deeper look in Operation Atlantic Resolve and how it has been translated in the field so far.
Troop levels
Operation Atlantic Resolve has always been an operation aimed to reassure NATO’s eastern allies and was never intended on the political level as a deterrent against Russia. Indeed, the troop levels involved have been kept low in order not to annoy Russia and force it to take a tougher stance against NATO.
This can be seen in the troop levels that have at the moment been deployed in the field itself. US troops have been rotating in and out of the Baltic States and Poland at regular levels and have kept a continuous presence. Even though Operation Atlantic Resolve mentions the forward deployment of brigades the real strength in the field has always been company or battalion level at best. It is clear that these levels have no real military meaning since they are too small to count for a deterrent and only have a political symbolic meaning of telling NATO members Eastern Europe that the United States has not forgotten them.
Low troop levels are indeed the main problem for Operation Atlantic Resolve. Even with a third brigade being deployed this number still falls short of the seven that would be needed to create a credible deterrent against Russia, according to a study by the RAND corp.
Training value
With low troop levels in the field and their rotational character it is hard to see how this can translate into a training value. Eastern European NATO members are still in the transition from their Cold War status to a professional western minded army. Already a lot of progress has been made in transforming these armies and bringing them up to NATO standards but work still remains and especially in the field of integrating armies into bigger units.
Aside from Poland and Rumania, there are only small armies in Eastern Europe, each one of them lacking the numbers to create a deterrence against Russia. The only way for these countries to fight successfully is to train them to integrate their armies into a larger NATO led coalition. The tactics and procedures for this are already known and have been used several times in the past under different NATO coalitions. But theory and the practical work are two different items.
It is general known that units who never, or almost never, train together, perform less in military conflict when they are put together. Thus there is a strong need for US troops to keep practising with Easter European armies as part of Operation Atlantic Resolve. But even here the goals of Operation Atlantic Resolve are falling short compared to the needs.
Although there have been several military exercises in the framework of Operation Atlantic Resolve there were few large ones, and even fewer with a sufficient US Army presence. By rotating small groups in and out the US assures that a large amount of small units are getting the necessary experience to work together with their Eastern European Allies but they are rotated to fast in order to maintain this experience. It is also doubtful if enough lessons learned are recorded that will have a real impact in a real conflict. By sending companies and battalions the United States are learning the problems of interlocking allied armies on small scale levels but are missing the capabilities of interlocking larger army formations.
A second error in training is linked to the small amount of troops present. In any real conflict we will see the Baltic States and Poland reinforced by several brigades delivered by NATO and under NATO command. If the United States are only deploying companies and battalions it start to lack the skills needed to operate brigades and armies. These are however the skills that will be needed in any military confrontation in the Baltic Region. It is expected that the armed forces of the Baltic States will be integrated in a larger force structure coordinated and controlled by the United States.
Thus the US needs to re-evaluate its training mission in Eastern Europe. At the moment the US is training to insert small troops and let them fight under the command and control of the host states while the real military purpose is to learn how to command and control the brigades of the host states and let them integrate in the NATO structure that needs to be set up.
Allied contributions
While the United States are taking the lead in protecting the eastern flank of NATO it should be noted that this excludes the NATO members in Western Europe. As mentioned earlier there is a need for at least seven brigades stationed in the Baltic Region to create a conventional deterrent against Russia. Already the United States are delivering three of these brigades.
All the time the European Union has shown to make no use of its EU Battle groups (EUBG). These EUBG’s are the size of a brigade and are composed by the military contributions of several EU members. At all times there are two EUBG’s at the command of the European parliament and ready to be deployed on short notice. While the EU recognizes that it needs to develop its own military capabilities and has the responsibility to protect its own borders it has done little in the past two years to make a contribution.
Should the EU decides to station its two EUBG’s in Eastern Europe then, combined with the three US brigades already available, NATO would already have five of the seven required brigades in place. It is clear that the EU is currently less interested in the security environment on her eastern flank. This does make sense since several of the larger EU members, namely those in Western Europe, are faced with a refugee crisis that has been unseen in the last decades. Thus their security issues are on Europe’s southern flank, not its eastern, and thus the EU is more than happy to let the United States take the leading role.
Still, the EU is missing a big opportunity. First, it misses the chance to deploy its EU Battle Groups in earnest, sending them to the places where their deployment has the biggest impact on the collective security of the continent. Second the EU is lacking the knowledge of integrating the armed forces of its 28 member states into one smooth working European Army, albeit based on the NATO framework. Deployment of the EUBG’s would enhance this capability and allow EU members to train and exercise together as well as learning the strategic and operational environment of the Baltic Region, Europe’s most vulnerable region from a military point of view.
Conclusion
Operation Atlantic Resolve is mainly a political operation aimed to create reassurance between allies but misses her mark of creating the needed military deterrent that the countries in Eastern Europe have been looking for.
As such, Operation Atlantic Resolve is suffering from three main problems. The amount of troops involved are too low and rarely exceed the level of battalion. As a result the United States is training and preparing on the wrong level. The armies in Eastern Europe, and especially in the Baltic States, are smaller than the forces the US already has in the continent. While it should be these forces learning to integrate in a US/NATO led coalition should the need arise the Unites States is training to integrate its forces in the armies of its host nations, a total opposite effect of what should be needed.
A third problem is not so much the fault of the United States but more the result of the EU not using the tools it already has. The EU has two brigade sized forces, the EU Battle Groups, available to contribute and strengthen Operation Atlantic Resolve, it still has not used them where they are needed the most. This means that while the US is at least gaining political and military dividends from being in Europe’s most threatened region, the EU will be the biggest loser since it does not take the opportunity to strengthen its military presence or train in integrating all its military forces coming from 28 different member states.
As a main conclusion we can state that Operation Atlantic Resolve is in need of an evaluation and that the emphasis should be on deploying more troops to create the needed conventional deterrent against Russia, a right level of training in line with what will be realistically expected in the event of a conflict and finding means to get the EU more involved in the defence of her eastern flank.