The Baltic States of Estonia and Latvia find themselves in a disadvantageous strategic position. Both countries share a land border with Russia, whom they see as the biggest threat to their national security. Even though Russia is currently military engaged in Eastern Ukraine and Syria and might possibly target Moldova as a new place in Europe to test NATO’s resolve, the possibility exist that Russia might interfere either covertly or overtly in the Baltic States.
This raises the question on how to defend the Baltic States of Estonia and Latvia in the face of a Russian aggression against their territory. Both nations face a strategic dilemma on how and where to deploy their forces to counter the Russian threat. This dilemma balances between the two extremes Russia can be using, namely Hybrid Warfare or a full scale invasion. Since we are focussing on Estonia and Latvia themselves, we will disregard any deployments of NATO forces within these two countries.
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| Of the three Baltic States, Estonia and Latvia are the most exposed and share a border with mainland Russia |
The Hybrid Warfare scenario
Should Russia decide to employ Hybrid Warfare against these two nations then we can expect Russia to make use of the large ethnic Russian populations in these two countries. These ethnic Russians will be used to create uprisings and possibly an armed rebellion against the Estonian and Latvian governments. We can expect Russia to employ the same playbook that it used in Eastern Ukraine.
The largest concentrations of ethnic Russians can be found in the capitals, Tallinn and Riga, and in the border regions at the Russian border. In the event of an armed uprising it is expected that police forces within the capitals are sufficiently strong to deal with the protests and demonstrations as we have seen in Ukrainian cities like Odessa. However, in the border areas we expect a much violent uprising, possibly aided by Russian “volunteers”. It is expected that Estonian and Latvian armed forces will move forward in these areas and aid police forces in restoring government control. It also possible that in the event of a slowly developing crisis that the armed forces are send in advance to keep events constraint and under control.
Both Estonia and Latvia will choose for a forward deployment of their troops at the Russian border in the event of a Hybrid War, not only to contain uprisings and restore order but also to deter Russia to send volunteers and equipment over the border in order to create a long lasting conflict that might take years to resolve. This forward deployment makes sense and both Estonia and Latvia have already stated that they will follow this course when they are confronted with a Hybrid Warfare scenario similar to that of Eastern Ukraine. The problem however is that both nations will make themselves vulnerable for another Russian threat, the one of an invasion.
The Russian invasion scenario
It is very unlikely that Russia will attempt an invasion of Estonia and Latvia and trigger NATO’s article 5 of collective defence. And yet in the past years we have seen Russia willing to take military risks to achieve political goals. A Russian invasion is possible and the Kremlin might undertake it but only under the right circumstances such as a weak and divided NATO and low cohesion among EU member states. Russia will aim for a swift invasion before NATO can react. Russia might indeed be tempted to believe that it can win if it faces NATO and the EU with a fait accompli where the liberation of Estonia and Latvia will come at a high price and that this will deter certain NATO and EU members. The possibility of a Russian invasion exists, however unlikely it might seem to us. How then could we expect Estonia and Latvia to behave in this scenario?
A recent study by the RAND Cooperation has shown that Russia could invade Estonia and Latvia and take the capitals in a timeframe between 36 and 60 hours. These predictions are in line with an earlier statement by the Czech General Petr Paval who claimed that Russia could occupy the three Baltic States within 48 hours.
Both parties claim that the Estonian and Latvian armed forces on their own are incapable to resist a Russian invasion of their territory. The RAND Cooperation went even so far as to claim that all army formations deployed to face the Russian advance will be overtaken by the speed of the Russian invasion, encircled and taken out the fight. Even the mechanized brigades of Estonia and Latvia lack the power to severely halt the Russian invasion when deployed for a manoeuvre war.
Faced with this reality the best option for Estonia and Latvia will be to defend vital core regions for as long as possible, tying down Russian troops and buy time for NATO to mount a counteroffensive to liberate the territory lost.
A core region in a country is usual the region that houses most of the industry and political power, preserving the legitimacy of the government that controls it. When we look at these two Baltic States then we can only see two core regions that need to be defended, namely the capitals.
Tallinn and Riga houses most of the population of the Baltic States, is the seat of the government and have large industrial areas. Both capitals are also important ports and have large airfields that can serve as a point of debarkation for allied forces. The longer these capitals are kept out of Russian hands the more time NATO has to come to a consensus and mobilize troops for a counter offensive. When faced with a prospect of a Russian invasion we can thus expect Estonia and Latvia to concentrate their defences around their capitals whom are however on the other side of the country when viewed from the Russian border.
The strategic dilemma
The strategic dilemma for Estonia and Latvia thus becomes very clear when they have to defend themselves on their own. When faced with the prospect of a Russian invasion it will be in their best interests to defend their capitals for as long as possible. The urban terrain greatly favours the defenders in these areas allowing them to drag the conflict long enough for NATO to respond in force. The downside is that the armed forces are thus placed in the wrong position to strike fast and contain a Hybrid War in their border areas.
If the armed forces are however stationed in their border areas in order to anticipate an Eastern Ukraine style armed uprising then they become vulnerable for a Russian invasion. The armed forces of Estonia and Latvia are too small to conduct a successful fighting retreat towards their capitals. With the exception of their mechanized forces, it is expected in the study by the RAND Cooperation that the armies of Estonia and Latvia will move to slow and will be overtaken and encircled by the Russian spearheads.
The solution of this strategic dilemma will not be found in either Estonia or Latvia. The only guarantee to defend these two nations will be the deployment of allied forces, either NATO troops or troops under the EU, to strengthen the defences of these two countries.
The most ideal solution, and the one preferred by Estonia and Latvia, will be stationing several armoured and mechanized brigades inside the country while the Estonian and Latvian armies take up position in the border areas. This allows these nations to deal with Hybrid Warfare on their own while the strong allied force further inland will act as a conventional deterrent against a Russian invasion.
