In an earlier article we talk about the possibility of Russia to invade Lithuania and create a land bridge between Kaliningrad and Belarus. The southern part of Lithuania has the necessary infrastructure in roads and railways to support an east-west movement that could sustain Russian forces in capturing and holding this land bridge. We also deemed this military course of action as highly unlikely since such a military operation by Russia would lead to a military response by the EU and NATO and trigger a larger war. Lately however another hypothetical vital area vital to this land bridge has been identified, the Suwalki Gap.
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| Location of the Suwalki Gap |
Named after the Polish town of Suwalki, the gap is a corridor of about 65km wide that connects Poland with Lithuania. Inside this gap leads the E-67 highway between Poland and Lithuania. This highway is vital for NATO as it supports any north-south movement necessary to deploy forces from eastern and central Europe into the Baltic States. Should Russia be able to close or interdict this gap then it could block or delay any NATO military forces send towards the Baltic States by land.
The Suwalki Gap is currently being referred as the new Fulda Gap but this is a wrong comparison. The Fulda Gap was the most likely attack route for the Soviet Army to invade Europe from East-Germany. NATO’s strategy was to block the Fulda Gap and thus preventing any Soviet breakthrough towards the Rhine River. The Fulda Gap was thus a blocking operation where NATO and Soviet forces would meet each other head on. NATO forces were not planning to advance beyond the gap into East-Germany itself, at least not in the initial stages. The Suwalki Gap however is a different operation.
The Suwalki Gap is NATO’s route of advance towards the Baltic States with the E-67 highway serving as a main route of supply (MSR). Unlike the Fulda Gap, any military action concerning Russia and NATO at the Suwalki Gap would be strike at each other’s flank. While Russia will be going for an east-west movement to create its land bridge, NATO will be executing a north-south movement in the Russian flank. Instead of going for a blocking operation like the Fulda Gap, NATO will be looking for keeping it open and prevent interdiction by Russia.
Russia is currently not in a position to challenge NATO in a war, especially not with military operations in Syria and Russian forces stationed in Eastern Ukraine. This however doesn’t mean that Russia hasn’t a formidable military might stationed in the Baltic Region. Russia’s main strength in this region lies at Kaliningrad, the home base of Russia’s Baltic Fleet. Consisting of a naval force of about 50 ships, the Baltic Fleet is the strongest naval fleet in the region. By operating from Kaliningrad the Baltic Fleet is in a central position to block the coastline of the Baltic States or to block the entrance of the Baltic Sea by taking station in front of its entrance at Denmark.
Kaliningrad also has two airfields to sustain air operations in the region and is occupied by three infantry brigades. Iskander-M tactical ballistic missiles with a range up to 500km and S-300 missiles capable of covering a third of Polish territory give these forces the necessary military power to interdict the region.
Given the strength and capabilities of the Baltic Fleet it is very unlikely that NATO forces can resupply the Baltic States by sea in the event of a war with Russia in this region. This makes the Suwalki Gap an important area as it is the only region to supply the Baltic States over land. The importance of the Suwalki Gap is however tied to the strategic region of Kaliningrad. Any war in the Baltic Region will see NATO trying to take Kaliningrad as soon as possible, forcing the Baltic Fleet to operate from its naval bases at Saint-Petersburg at the end of the Gulf of Finland, a far less advantageous strategic position.
Even though a war between NATO and Russia is theoretical, as none of the two actors feel up to confront each other, it is important to take the situation of the Suwalki Gap in account. As long as Kaliningrad remains in Russian hands then the only viable land connection between Eastern Europe and the Baltic States is the Suwalki Gap, making the area important even as a mere exercise in logistics.
The terrain in the Suwalki Gap favours interdiction by Russia. The Wiegirski nature park at the border with Belarus has few roads and favours infiltration by small land forces through the wooded terrain. This allows for observation and interdiction of the MSR by Russian Special Forces. The Russian Air Force is capable of covering the entire Suwalki Gap, operating under the protection of its S-300 surface to air missiles while Iskander-M ballistic missiles can strike targets in the area.
As noted above, any war between NATO and Russia concerning the Suwalki Gap will trigger a larger war between these two actors and result in a shift of focus where NATO will try to take Kaliningrad as soon as possible to neutralize the threat of the Russian forces stationed in this region. This makes it impossible for Russia to interdict the Suwalki Gap with its full might.
Even if the Suwalki Gap is the only region for NATO to exercise a north-south movement to resupply the Baltic States it is not the focal point when such a movement coincides with Russia’s east-west movement to create a land bridge between Kaliningrad and Belarus. The focal point will be the Lithuanian town of Marijampolë where the roads and railways converge. Whoever can hold Marijampolë will be able to completely block the movement of the opposition. Should Russia be able to block the Suwalki Gap at Suwalki then it can take Marijampolë before NATO can reinforce it. If NATO arrives first at Marijampolë then it can block Russia’s east-west movement.
