As NATO faces new challenges it becomes more and more apparent on how divided NATO is on the political level. A large dividing line runs through the alliance dividing it in the members that are committed to alliance and pulling their share of the burden and the members who take the alliance for granted and engage in what is called free riding.
NATO’s role has changed in these past three decades. With the disappearance of the common enemy, the USSR, NATO struggled long to find a new purpose to exist as the world entered a relatively calm period. This temporary calm and stability led many NATO members to believe that the role of the alliance was over and that there was no need for having a powerful military organization aimed to defend Europe and North America.
Over the past years the arc of instability has come closer to the European continent and the need for a strong defensive military organization to deal with the new challenges and threats becomes clear once more. But most western leaders still hold their commitment back, counting on US military power to protect their territory and integrity. This behavior, called free riding, fundamentally undermines the alliance and causes for a dividing line between those who take US commitment and protection for granted and those who actively strengthen the alliance. This divide, if left unsolved, will become a point of friction, one that will be exploited by those who oppose NATO.
NATO was founded to be a defensive military organization based on common defense. The main initiative for the NATO alliance came at the beginning of the Cold War were the countries of western Europe were military too weak to face a potential threat of the USSR on their own. Article 5, that states that an attack against one member is an attack on the whole alliance, gave these weakened European states a credible deterrence, especially with the backing of the US armed forces.
A military strong Europe also benefitted the United States in making a stronger stand against the threat of the USSR. As such the US always had a strong commitment on the European continent. This resulted in a strange relationship where smaller European states started to become reluctant to show a full commitment knowing that they were protected by larger and stronger allies. This free riding behavior became more and more apparent as the Cold War progressed, forcing the US to back its European allies even more in order to remain the military balance against the USSR.
NATO had no real threat to face after the fall of the USSR and defense spending among most of its allies started to decrease as the massive armed forces build up during the Cold War were no longer needed. Without the struggle between the superpowers the arc of instability receded away from Europe with smaller conflicts appearing mainly in Africa and the Middle East. The European countries were even less inclined maintain their armies in world of small conflicts with low to no impact.
Things changed when the European Union expanded towards the east and its new members joined NATO as well. These countries have always been living with a history of Russian aggression against their countries. Seeking a better defensive position these countries were well aware of the implications of NATO and Article 5. Without a strong alliance Article 5 would be meaningless. This is one reason why eastern European, Baltic and Nordic countries are among the higher contributors of NATO when looking at the two percent GDP guideline NATO proposes. These countries aim to build a strong army on their own that also strengthens the alliance as a whole.
A second reason is that these countries need Article 5 and in the end, US commitment in the absence of strong western European armies. As such these countries cannot afford to free ride the alliance since they need to build up good and reliable relations with other NATO members. Ironically it are the older, and mostly the free riding nations, that keep a close eye on the new NATO members to see if they do their commitment.
Consequences
The dividing line between the contributors and the free riders is already grave enough in theory but it can end up dramatically in the long run. Western European countries still don’t seem to convinced to increase their military spending to the two percent GDP guideline, even when conflicts are coming closer to the European continent. Many members still take US protection for granted and the US can’t afford the political cost of abandoning or even reducing its presence on the continent, especially not against the new NATO members that are committed to the alliance.
This dividing line is already a point of friction between several member states where the new NATO allies, faced with a more aggressive Russia, are looking for additional support to back them up and find western Europe unable or unwilling to come to their aid. The situation is already so advanced that several NATO members, such as Poland, are even discussing the fact if they can still count on Article 5 and if western Europe is willing to come to their aid.
Likewise the United States is growing tired of backing up unwilling allies, especially when it is facing a growing China. But as long as Europe can not defend itself the US will be forced to poor troops on the continent. Since Operation Atlantic Resolve the US has been rotating a brigade sized element in eastern Europe to assure its allies and deter Russia from any sudden actions. It is frustrating for the US to know that the EU has two battlegroups the size of a brigade sitting by idle instead of being forward deployed.
Unless the older NATO members are starting to pull their share and get their armed forces back into shape the dividing line will become more and more a point of friction. Several of NATO’s adversaries, like Russia, already know how to act military fast or covert enough to keep NATO guessing of what actions it should take. Working inside the decision making process is becoming easy for Russia who keeps perfecting its Hybrid Warfare.
In the future, Russia could even undermine the NATO alliance from within if starts exploiting the division between contributors and free riders. By pitting eastern and western Europe against each other it can prevent the European members of NATO to come together and create a solution on how the strengthen NATO by European means instead of only looking to the US.
Conclusion
NATO’s two percent of GDP investment in defense is a guideline and not a binding rule. This gives countries the freedom to decide on how much they want to invest in their armed forces. Given a certain set of economic and social parameters, a country will have to make choices in how much of the two percent it wishes to invest. Over the last decades we see that several NATO members have been engaging in free riding behavior, counting on others to provide their collective security needs.
With the expansion of NATO the new members are keen to stay as close to the two percent as possible. First, because of their own security needs and second for proving themselves to be trustworthy partners in the alliance. With instability and conflicts coming closer and closer to Europe there is a call for NATO to strengthen itself and be ready to face new challenges. Several members however still engage in free riding and this causes a point of friction between those who are committed and those who take it for granted.
If this point of friction can not be resolved then it will be exploited by others. Russia, with its hybrid war, already operates faster than the NATO decision making process. Unless the burden of the collective defense is more equally spread and European members showing more commitment on the ground instead of letting the United States doing most of the work then Russia will have a mean to divide the alliance politically by playing on security interests of each member and pointing to this divide.
