Fears of a Russian invasion followed by an occupation are running high in the Baltic States. The three nations of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia have in their history witnessed several occupations and it is hard to imagine that these nations are fairly new countries in Europe. As Russia is becoming more assertive on the world stage it also became at certain points aggressive at its borders.
The liberation and recognition of the regions of South-Ossetia and Abkhazia in 2008 after a brief war with Georgia was followed with the annexation of the Crimea in 2014. Several countries at the border with Russia have been following these events and realize that their borders might not be as guaranteed as one takes for granted.
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| Lithuanian soldiers during an exercise |
Lithuania is the country that is most concerned about Russia’s intensions concerning the Baltic States. It fears that it falls under Russia’s sphere of influence and thus be subjugated to a Russian intervention in whatever form sooner or later. Lithuania has already been taking steps to deter Russia. New gas terminals were built to make the country less dependent on Russia energy supplies, conscription was reinstated, a manual published telling civilians what to do in the case of emergency and war as well as labelling Russian products to undermine the Russian economy. Still the country feels threatened and isolated.
How real is a Russian invasion of Lithuania and what are the factors that play a role to make such an invasion work. Understanding these factors can aid us to understand the security problems of the Baltic Region but one must take in mind that Russian military planners view things differently than Western planners. What we would consider a non-likely event might be likely to them and vice versa.
Lithuania is both a member of the EU and NATO. Any attack on this country would trigger NATO’s Article 5 of mutual defence and thus provoke a war against NATO. Russia’s only change of winning an intervention is to secure a swift and decisive victory before a strong reaction can be triggered. It is imperative that Russia can end the hostilities before politicians have time to invoke Article 5 and thus place NATO leaders with a fait accompli.
Central in any conflict between Lithuania and Russia will be the isolated region of Kaliningrad at the Baltic Sea. This naval base is home to Russia’s Baltic Fleet and has no land connection with Russia itself. Lithuania fears that Russia might try to create a land bridge with Kaliningrad. The question is how Russia would be capable of doing this.
A look on the map shows that Lithuania has no border with Russia expect for the Kaliningrad region. A land bridge between Kaliningrad and Russia proper can only be established if Russia chooses to invade both Lithuania and Latvia. Although Russia has the military power to defeat these two countries without much problems it has several downsides. An assault on two EU and NATO members will prompt a faster and tougher responds by NATO, something Russia would be wise to avoid. At the same time the time it takes to reach Kaliningrad will be a disadvantage to a fast and swift military campaign Russia seeks to execute.
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| Russia's little green men who occupied the Crimea without warning |
A better alternative is to create a land bridge between Kaliningrad and Belarus. This seems like a good idea as Belarus is a strong Russian ally. This places our focus however on Belarus and the position of this country. There is no doubt that Belarus is and will remain a strong Russian ally so the question remains on how willing Belarus is to get involved in a war between Russia and Lithuania. Although Belarus grants Russia the rights to base troops inside Belarus this is more as an additional protection of Belarus. Should these Russian troops cross the border between Belarus and Lithuania then Belarus becomes a belligerent partner as well. It is unlikely that Belarus has any intentions to get involved in a war between Russia and NATO, especially as Belarus would find itself on the side of the aggressors. A Russian intervention inside Lithuania in this scenario would however have the advantage that it creates two fronts. This will split the Lithuanian army in two and reducing the opposition Russian troops encounter at Kaliningrad and the border with Belarus. The effect will be that Russia will achieve a faster breakthrough resulting in a faster establishment of the land bridge. As stated before, Russia needs a fast achievement of its goals in order to give the EU and NATO as less time as possible to react and oppose the intervention.
A final scenario would be a Russian intervention coming out of Kaliningrad and pushing all the way to the border with Belarus. Operating at one front it can therefore not hope to divide the Lithuanian army as explained in the previous scenario. Since Kaliningrad is an isolated region it will take an amount of time to build up forces. Troops and equipment will have to be transported over sea from Saint Petersburg to Kaliningrad. A longer build up, especially of the amount of troops needed for a fast victory involves the risk of detection allowing Lithuania to build up its troops and already seeks assurances from its allies.
The creation of a land bridge with Belarus would be the most likely scenario. This scenario has several variations on how to execute it but in the end it all comes down on whether or not Belarus wants to get involved. The land bridge scenario also has the advantage that a total annexation of Lithuania is not needed. An annexation will never be accepted by EU and NATO members and thus hostilities between Russia and the West will continue. Although Russia could defeat Lithuania in a fast and complete manner and would enjoy the act of surprise in the first days it will face NATO resistance in a couple days that only gets stronger as time passes.
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| Road network of Southern Lithuania where the land bridge could be formed |
The land bridge would ideally be the area south of the rivers Nemunas (Neman) and Neris. This area holds several roads leading east-west and thus along the axis of advance. The road leading from Kaliningrad over Marijampolë towards Vilnius before heading back south to the city of Voranava just over the border with Belarus would be useful as a highway for support and supply. As second road leading from Marijampolë over Alytus and Daugai offers a second axis of advance. This second axis of advance also holds a railway from Kaliningrad to the city of Alytus.
A third road runs through Marijampolë to Lazdijai and then eastwards to Verena towards the border with Belarus. This road is however close to the Polish border and is thus vulnerable to a counterattack if Poland decides to intervene against Russia.
These east-west roads do not only serve to support the axis of advance of Russian troops but also to supply the enlarged Kaliningrad region directly from Belarus. Operating south of the rivers Nemunas (Neman) and Neris gives the Russians the advantage of protecting their northern flank with a natural obstacle. This raises the question on what will happen to the capital Vilnius and the city of Kaunas, both located at these rivers. An occupation of the two largest cities of Lithuania will be very hard for western leaders to accept. At the same time it allows Lithuanian armed forces to roll with the punches and regroup north of these rivers. With a Lithuanian army still capable to continue the fight it will be hard for Russia to get the fast and decisive victory it needs.
Conclusion
Lithuania fears a Russian invasion on its territory but in order for Russia succeed it needs a fast and decisive victory to confront western leaders with a fait accompli. Without a direct border Russia has few options. It either has to push through Latvia and Lithuania to reach Kaliningrad but attacking two countries at the same time will guarantee the firm commitment of western leaders to keep on fighting. The other option is to connect Kaliningrad with Belarus, a strong ally of Russia. A two front war will be unlikely unless Belarus chooses to be seen as an aggressor, further isolating this country.
A push only from Kaliningrad is a viable option but it will take time to build up the necessary troops, all transported over sea, before an attack can be made. This raises the chance of detection and thus allowing Lithuania and NATO to take countermeasures.
The theatre of operations will be restrained to the area south of the rivers Nemunas (Neman) and Neris as these offer a natural barrier to protect Russia’s northern flank. Three usable roads are in this region that support any east-west movement as well as a railway that spans half the territory between Kaliningrad and the city of Alytus. The two largest cities of Lithuania, Vilnius and Kaunas, however are in this region and occupying them will only strengthen western leaders to intervene. At the same time the Lithuanian Army is allowed a way out to regroup and to continue the fight, preventing any decisive victory for Russia.
Invading Lithuania is a very risky operation with a lot of unknown variables and possibilities. It seems very unlikely that Russia can act fast and decisive enough to prevent western leaders to react fast enough. In order for Russia to succeed it needs Belarus in order to divide Lithuanian armed forces and set the conditions for victory.
This doesn’t take away that the southern part of Lithuania has the infrastructure to support any east-west movement with three major roads and one railway to support and supply the axis of advance.
